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Constitutional Law should be harnessed in the service of disability law. That it has not been a central site for the 
advocacy of the disability rights movement is something that Professor W aterstone bemoans. In this Emory Law 
Journal article, he traces the seemingly bifurcated trajectories of the LGBT and Disability Rights movements, 
insofar as their use of constitutional strategy is concerned. Through a careful analysis of these moves, Prof. 
W aterstone concludes that the Disability Rights movement has suffered setbacks through constitutional law, but 
the time is ripe to recoup the use of constitutional law to advance the umbrella of disability rights. Harkening to 
recent victories in LGBT movements, this article seeks to lay a foundation for Disability Constitutional Law. 
Prof. Waterstone acknowledges that there likely exists amongst disability rights advocates an understandable 
reluctance to engage constitutional law stemming from the Cleburne1_ case, and its unfortunate legacy for the 
disability rights movement. While the holding in Cleburne'l:_ struck down an ordinance infringing the Equal 
Protection rights of persons with "mental retardation," the case has proven less progressive and unsupportive of 
disability rights broadly speaking. In holding that this disability classification was only entitled to rational basis 
scrutiny, the decision has become concretized in a way that, for practical purposes, has meant that "the most 
restrictive aspects" of the majority decision have "stayed frozen in time for people with disabilities." (P. 529.) 
Additionally, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have stretched Cleburne's application to include a "diverse 
universe of people with disabilities," thereby casting too long a shadow of rational basis scrutiny in the 
disability rights arena. (P. 542.) Specifically, in holding that the decision in Cleburne on mental retardation 
included a vastly expanded category of "the disabled," the Court in University of Alabama v. Garrettl 
significantly expanded the reach of Cleburne in a way that has proven hard to overcome. 
This legacy of constitutional opaqueness is disconcerting, especially given the ways in which LGBT advocates 
have successfully utilized the constitutional arena. Clearly there are opportunities to push forward a disability 
constitutional agenda in intentional ways. 
Though there have been setbacks for the movement, Prof. Waterstone analyzes the more rapid pace and 
progress of the LGBT movement through carefully strategized constitutional law advocacy. He suggests that, 
while there are obviously differences in the movements ("LGBT and disability causes are of course different, 
operating in different political and legal spaces" (P. 531) disability law can and should do more to, similarly, 
push for fulfillment of the Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and full citizenship. Drawing analogies 
to the LGBT movement, Prof. Waterstone notes both, admittedly umbrella, groups have a history of prejudice 
and segregation, and continue to experience stigma due to their long histories of discrimination. (P. 533.) 
Prof. Waterstone believes a rejuvenated constitutional law strategy for disability rights might correct a central 
error in Cleburne by creating a space for Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence that is uncoupled from pity and 
benevolence, and which is instead moored to historical oppression and a commitment to "contextualized Equal 
Protection review for state laws that facially discriminate against people with disabilities." (P. 533.) While 
Cleburne is far from perfect (i.e. the majority stated, "while racial minorities and women are all monolithic for 
purposes of state classification, people with mental retardation are not 'cut from the same pattern."' (P. 538.) 
and the majority opinion has been interpreted as assuming mentally retarded people to "be a class of naturally 
inferior people." (P. 541.) and has proven to be challenging precedent for disability rights advocates, proponents 
of marriage equality have faired better at harnessing the power of this precedent. LGBT activists "have 
mobilized more effectively and done more with Cleburne and the Equal Protection Clause in both federal and 
state courts." (P. 564.) As such, Prof. Waterstone urges that "[t]heir campaigns offer important lessons for 
disability advocates." (P. 564.)i 
Prof. Waterstone surfaces several examples of statutes that facially discriminate, particularly in the areas of 
"family law, voting, commitment proceedings [] the provision of benefits," bars to professional licensing, and of 
course employment and public accommodation. (P. 548-55.) As daunting as it might seem, and despite the 
majority decision in Cleburne, there remains a glimmer of hope not just from the progressive vision articulated 
in Cleburne by the respective concurrences and dissents of Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who preferred 
heightened scrutiny of state action on the basis of disability, but also because of the compelling dissent of 
Justice Breyer in Garrett, which "demonstrated an amenability to a more nuanced consideration of the 
constitutional dimension of state discrimination on the basis of disability."~ 
Thus Prof. Waterstone's piece sheds light on a more comprehensive and contextual path for disability rights 
advocacy, one that recognizes the constitutional building blocks in a similar way as have "LGBT advocates [] 
proven particularly adept at showing what is possible under state law [by using] Cleburne to help secure 
heightened scrutiny for marriage laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation." To demonstrate this 
potential, Prof. Waterstone highlights a promising Connecticut case. 
In Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,§_ a marriage equality case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
recognized its authority to evolve the Connecticut constitution as "an instrument of progress, [] intended to 
stand for a great length of time and[] not [to ... ] interpret[] [it] too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to 
have contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens."7_ In so doing, the Connecticut court acknowledged its 
"greater latitude" to weigh additional factors beyond the more narrow Supreme Court focus on the history of 
invidious discrimination and whether the distinguishing characteristic relates to one's ability to contribute to 
society, but- also to consider immutability and political powerlessness. (P. 573-74.) Using Justice Marshall's 
concurrence and dissent in Cleburne as a roadmap, the Connecticut court interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause by focusing on "the social and cultural isolation of the excluded group." (P. 574.) Importantly, the court 
also took the view that protective legislation acknowledged, and did not indicate the end of, intentional 
discrimination. (P. 574.) Together with a few other cases,§_ Prof. Waterstone holds the Kerrigan case up for 
disability rights activists - its embrace of four constitutional factors, instead of just two, offers a more robust 
analysis which he interprets as boding well for disabled individuals. I hope he is right. 
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